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Public Reaction to Risk Analysis 
In 1973, the Ford Motor Cor1pany .introduced to the American automobil,~-
buying publlc the Ford Pinto. Weighing 2000 pounds and eost.ing; on1y 
$2.000, it was shepherded from the drawing· board to production in only 3Li 
Iv'2ieks, som(~what of c1 record in the automobiL~ business \vhe1~e two-year 
.lead.times are not unheard of 1c1ven under moderately severe time pressures 
from competition. For the Ford Motor Cmnpany, the Pinto was a successful 
entry into the small car :nurket and became one of the more popular cornpact 
automobiles on the road. 
Five years later, the Ford Pinto sat disected on the floor of an 
Indiana courtroom, its r.1anufacturers charged with criminal negligence for 
failing to design its fuel tank sturdy enough to withstand a rearend 
collision that took the li.ves of thrf.!e t,~enagers. Arnid eourtroom testimony 
of expert witnessess and mutual charges of irresponsibility, a spotlight 
was cast on the behavior of Ford e,n~cuti ves and .. ~ngineers, and the decision 
they made to not install a relatively inexp~nsive component in the Pinto's 
fm:1 tank tbat would hav1c! helped pn~vent such cat as trophic consequences. 
Though F'ord Motor Co. was ultimate exonerated of the criminal negligence 
charg,~s brought tit, an impo~taat side effect of the publicity 
assoc.:i.aced with the C<'lGe 'i.Jas the reve.lat.ion of a c:ost-benefit i.s F1:lrd 
had SU done to show that making safety ts to the Pinto's 
h112l tank was not reaH01.11:1ble the balance of costs ta benefits, even 
at lesr; than $?0 per vehi.cli'" .g., J}owie, 1977). ?art of that 1malysi.s 
attached a. specLflc dol.l.ar value to the lives that could be e:,;pectf:~d to be 
lost if thP fuel tank modtfi.cation W[1.::1 not undertaken. The press indicted 
Ford with callously trading human lives for dollars. Ford argued that 
cost-benefit analysis was a standard fixture in many government 
organi%atioas, and that, indeed, it had even patterned its cost-benefit 
ana.lysis after OW" done by the National Traffic S.Jfety 
Adudntstratton, using their value-of-lift~ methodology. 
The :r,:al impact of Ford I s use of cos t-bt'm,fi t analysis on the. criminal 
c.hargf-~.s brought t them is difficult to assess; it does not appear 
that the prosecuting attorney even brought it into evidence in the trial. 
What was stgn:Lficant about the case, however, was that for the first time, 
an application of a formalized decision-making methodology, costbenefit 
analysis, received sharp criticism in the national press, sensitizing the 
public to tht1 existence and use of thes(~ ;::iethodologt1:.~s. and exposing those 
who conduct them to public criticism. 
What is the potential significance of such adverse public r~a~tion 
to a formal fk,ciaion methdology and how can one bf!gin und,~rstanding and 
addressing lay people's concerns? This paper discusses some general 
issues related to this question and touches on research topics that would 
further our knowledg~ of how to incorporate formal analysis into the 
societal decision-making arena. 
An Empirical _Approach 
to shed sonH:: li ton this question in. r:he :forn1 
an rica.l. di rec.ti:d toward t,nde•r:-s tand 
1Jn wh:t.2h fqrma.l dects:ton approaches are j (J1a.cGregor fs. S:lovi{:, 
l ). That study cRlled indtv:i.dual.s to j a nuQber of decision-
f:lpproaches cast in the conte:ct ;)f t·vm d.ifferent hypnt:heticr:i1 
,:onEtt1mer decisions, one invnl a to the rlc"s o:f 
the fuel tank of a compact automobile (a case somewhat paralleling that of 
the Ford Pinto), and a second involving a in the formulation of a 
pres antibiotic drug chat would reduce th8 risk of potentially 
f~tal side effects. Formal analysis w,rn repct'.'Sented by a C(rnt-berH:'fit 
analysis similar to that in Figun:o 1. An abbn:,viated version of Figure l 
elim.inated the va.lue of life st,,~ps (F and G) and was r1<1med, for comrenience 
sake, expected value risk analysis. The primary difference between the two 
approaches cane r:it the step of assigning an explicit va}ue of life and 
trading it off against costs. In the cost-benefit case, the manufacturer 
making the decision was portrayed as acting strictly on the balance of 
costs to benefits; in the expected value risk analysis case, the 
manufacturer was portray(~d as making a dE!liherative decisi.on on the basi.s 
of the change in expected fatalities should product safety be altered. A 
third method involved simply Hhiding by standard manufacturiag practices 
within the industry. Other factors in the decision context wen? varied, 
including whether or not product safety was improvecl as the result of 
applying the decision methodology. 
Insert Figure l About Here 
Individual::; ·were asked to study the decision context and thP app.r,)ach 
rK!J.at to iLs bility. 2 presents a factor analysis af 
those ~valuative ratings. The points in the factor space represent 
dr::ci.sion situati.ons fn uhich each o t the thrt~e dec.i. sion approadw.s 
,HT,~ usc,d. Two basJ.c factors frot.:i tht• an.al s. The fir.st factor, 
on the hor:izontal nxts, relat1:•s t(' the "lcsi;ic;a.l. soundnc;;r; " of the deeiH:ion 
.:,pproach and :ts Hied by such j ts as the quality of its 
apparent teness, and understandability. The second factor, on the, 
vertical axis, re1at.-,s to the '\nor.al sensitivity" of the approach. Its 
s we, ra j ts such as e.mbodiment of :noral and ,~thical 
considE:rations, and sensit.ivity to those 1-mpacted by the decision. ln 
general, poL1ts in the upper right qu:ldnmt received positive evaluations 
on both factors while points in the lower left r,::cei ved negative 
evaluat:lons. 
Insert Figure 2 About Here 
Several results are apparent from ~he factor plot of Figure 2. First, the 
factor structure suggests that there is reasonable order to the perceptions 
people httv,:; of decision-making approaches, even when they ,,n-e emb!:'dded :i.n 
contexts consisting of other details. The dimensions emerging from the 
factor analysis, "logical soundness" and "mor.al ,3ensitivity" an,! suggestive 
of the types of concerns that both lay and expert might consider mf:aningful 
and .i.mportant. This is encouraging because tt provides evidence that tlw 
types of reactions to cost-benefit analysis that surfaced as part of Ford's 
experience with thE.! P:into fuel tank design ar1'! amenable to study in an 
sonnd framework. ( Something about further eeseareh here'?) 
Second, the upper r quadrant: is do111inr1t:ed by decLc;ion 
situati.ons :i. which tht:: manufacturer a r:tsk ann but dtd not 
take the step of attaching a fie dollar value to lives, instead 
con Hider the ri.sks in n d(0 1.iberative rnannr,.r ("e:i.:peeted value risk 
quadrant is domi~ated sitllt:tt.ions in wt1l<~h. 
the ma1niL:11:turcc abidt'::d by standard pr,1Jcttc1:,s w_i_ thi.n the indus ry. Cost-· 
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benefit , as portrayed in Figure l, tended to occupy a middle 
position. 
The Rol1~ of Deliberation 
What one draws f.ro11 thec:e dat;:, depends, in part, on one's perspective. 
Certainly, iona1 d,:ccision make.rs take the! v:iic;w that increased 
explicitness and is on normative modeling of a decision are critt~ria 
tG be highly valued, and that a decision-making m(,thod ean b12> judgt:!d 
independently of the cont,~xt in whieh it is appLif2'd. Ind1~ed, the goal of 
methodo1ogies such as risk/cost-benefit analysis has been to assist policy 
and decision maki~g by providingng a picture of risks .. as they really ari! 
in a way that ,::ould facilitate mnktng choices between hazacdous 
aJ_te:rnative'3. This attention to objectivity has led r:lsk analysts and, 
pi~rhaps, decision makers in general to lean heavily on method as the basic 
support for the actions they choose to take, with an emphasis on 
quantifying risks in actuarial terms for the purpose of comparing them on a 
common, often monetized, scale. Embod:l.i~d in the perspective of formal 
analysis are some very strong advantages. Formal techniques provide 
normative underpionings for justifying a decision maker's actions, they 
help avoid 1.:~rr.or brought on by the cognitive limitr1tions of the decision 
makE•r, they foster better comm1.micationG about the decision as well as mon~ 
effective evaluation after the fact, and they make explicit value 
tradeoffs) thus helping t0 insure that decision makers will be consistent 
What formal strives to achieve in a sense, is to make 
icit tlH! compon(~nts of a decision-making problem. In a g,,,nf>.r:-al ·wa.y, it 
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quality of the choice proc~ss and, indeed, should be avoided if possible. 
Howevc,r, those exposed to th,c! decisions of others may judgci decision 
methods by a differ~nt set of criteria. Among methods that ~IBk2 ~isk 
infornatioo (?xplici t, are those that make expllci t the val,1e trad,2offs 
i:1volved ta arriving at ft choice, such as cost-benefit analysis. Among 
s in decision making, eost-benefit analysis has been an object of 
controversy. For some d0c:tsion··,Mking si tuat tons jl lJtffticularly those 
i,iv,)lving health and safety consequences, meet the criterion of explicit 
value tradt,offs means attaching a monetary value to nonmarketed goods. 
Both the valni.ng of non-marketable commoditi,:'!s And the baland.ng of costs 
and benefits in a monetarily bai,ed calculus has been criticized on ethlcal 
g,~ounds (sec~, for example, Kelman, 1981). Public evaluations of cost-
beri<:;fi t analysis r:1ay contain parallels to these typ~,>.s o:t argumtonts, as tht• 
data presentBd abovi::! suggests. In some conttixt:s, a thoughful consideration 
of risk information may be preferred to an analysis that makes explic:i.t 
value tradeoffs involving health and saf,:'!ty. 
Decision El,'.-lkers may want to consid,~r placing special emphasis on 
understanding the moral and ethical concerns that ;':tr<'! i.mpor.tant to those 
affected by the d,?ci.sion they make. They n.a)' want as vN::'! 11 to study the 
ext,trnt to which those concerns ::n·," r~fl<1eted in the mcithodologies thf!Y use 
to assist them in deci.s:lon making. It nHy be that the process of 
dRliberation s seen tant moral and 
ethical considerations are reflected l" a decision making process. 
lncrea_si.ne: the of ,rrt~chan.tzation of .3. choic~e proct:1ss rnay servt~ 
to thos,,: it was deslgn,~.d to 1wirve. If rJsk an,ci is and otl.wr. formr:llized 
·, , 
appr,)achE)S to decision mak:i.ng are to achieve a broad publ i.-.: 
consensus of support, ways need to he. found t;) insure that soft, social 
values <1:n~ appar,~nt 5.n their 1?:\x1:,cution. 
At , ,,e. know very littl<:~ about how peoph,. wish to see 
nonmarketed consid(~rat:lons L1corporat,::!d i:1to d<~cision·-mak:i.ng approachE,s. 
Deliberation i.s, pE;rhaps, one approach, but would havr::! to spelled Ollt much 
more clearly for it to play any practical role. For example,, are the::::-e 
situations when:: deliberation is clearly not acceptable, such as when 
unaccompanied by any a.nalysi:s of risks? What is th£! appropriate balance 
between an explicit analysis of risks and an unexplicated, intuittve 
weighing of those risks? What constitutes evidence to people of suffic.ient 
d,~1:l.beration? ls the perceived quality of a decision·-maker 's dt!lihEiration 
related to other aspects of that individual or institution, such as trust 
and confidence? 
Evaluation by Context 
Public concerns over risk analysis may stem in part from a tendency to 
judge a decision approach not in isolation, hut in terms of events 
subsequent to its application. For thP decision maker, choosing a method 
or approach is an early st•=P in a process that also involves (some\,1hat 
later) selecting an alternative and experiencing consequences. A spectator 
to these stages may not be ablt.>: to evaluate the method independently of 
thelr j ts of othei~ s of the conti:::xt. They may apply a form of 
"t:1lls well th;;t ,,mds W<:!11" , when! deeis1.on·-r:u1ki.ng; methods thnt 
are compatible with their own intuitions, and that lead to choices 
,;,,rouJ.d J:ikc to see made, .are the most highly vahwd. From the perspective 
of the consequences experienced by those to the actions of a 
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deeision mnkel:, decision-making methods c.cm appear to lead to inevitable 
resu1 ts. When those n~sul ts an: positivr~ly valued, the d,::-cision·-::naking 
method lead t,> them may h~~ positively valued rm well. This form of 
causal reasoni~g subsequent stages of a decision process are seen 
as daterminisitical linked to the outcome of the previous stages would 
suggest that lay perceptions at least can be understood only by examining 
the full context in which a decision approach s applied. 
Ano the,~ way .i.n which context :11ay influence the perc.ei·.,ed acceptabil i. ty 
of risk analysis arises from the complex nature of r,Jal·-world decisions. 
Taken in isolRtion, a decision problem to which risk analysis has been 
applied may appear very different than when expressed in the context of a 
host of decisions. Furthermore, the ri::.~asonableness of the inputs to :i risk 
analysis may c.hang(~ when a singular decision is viewed arno11g a plurality of 
choi.ces to he 1,1ade. For exa,11ple, the fuel·-tank decision made by F0rd 
involved choosing between including or omitting a relatively inexpensive 
saf,ety component. Viewed in isolation, a small additional cost per car 
could be judgf.~d a reasonable amount to pay for any increment in safety. On 
the other hand, automobile desi:;i;ners must make many such decisions and 
tradeoffs, not just for safety, but performance and styling as well. 
Perhaps Ford's decision to leave out a relatively inexpensive part that 
provided a small reduction in risk would have beeen regarded differ(~ntly .if 
i. t were onl'o anong many such i parts that add up t•) a much lnrge.r 
of an isolated decision in another context. Elahornt 
of 1:he many dcid.:;;ions involved in thEi des and 
decislon ls se~n. 
C .i 
, for example, some 
of a product 
Realization of Consequences 
One of the rules that decision makers are learning to live by is that 
in a probabilistic world "good" outcomes can never be guaranteed. No 
matter how carefully a decision maker analyzes a problem, events can occur 
that can make a seemingly complete analysis deficient. Part of this may be 
due to our inability to anticipate all of the ways in which things could go 
wrong. Consequently, knowledge of how events turn out can lead us to 
believe that decision makers could or should have been able to anticipate 
that future. 
Outcome knowledge may also influence perception of risk anlaysis by 
making conrete that which is abstract in the analysis. For example, 
expected (statistical) deaths are abstract, unidentified, future deaths 
which are not familiar to us in the same way as are everyday (potential) 
personal relationships. On the other hand, an actual identified life in 
jeopardy may concretize aspects of an analysis that were only imaginary at 
the time it was conducted. Retrospectively, the analysis may seem less 
sensitive to human and moral concerns than it did prospectively. 
The quality of an outcome may have an effect on the acceptability of 
some procedural aspects of an analysis. For example, the acceptability of 
placing a dollar value on lives may differ depending on whether things turn 
out for better or worse. In an unpublished pilot study, groups of 
individuals were presented with an overview of the Pinto case and a version 
of the cost-benefit analysis similar that used by the Ford Motor Co. They 
were also given a brief explanation of the concept of placing a dollar 
value on life for decision-making purposes. Subsequently, they were asked 
to express their degree of agreement with the value-of-life concept. When 
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no deta.:Lls of conr{equences following !cord's ded.ston WC\l'.'e g;iwcn, slightly 
less than half (43%) indicated that they with the concept. Howev1:ir, 
for a separate group, told of the deaths of three ,,,hen t ht: fuel -
tank of their Pineo exploded on rear-end t, agreem,rnt dropped to 12;~. 
These resuits suggest that lo the context of a real-~orld decision problem, 
of events subsequent to the decision can color bow portions of an 
analysis ;u:-e j 
Directions :for Future Research 
Risk analysis is a relatively new disr::tpline. Its mt0 thods are 
controversial, even mnong experts, and untried in many problem domains. 
Wber2 it has been used, there is evidence that it has not always been used 
properly. Adequate guidelines are not readily availabh~ to insurr:>. that its 
application by the untutored and inexperienced will meet any accepted 
standards of qunlity. Exposure of such an i.nfant technology to the public 
poses formidable risks to .its chances for long-term survival. However, to 
shelter it frora public view only fqcreases the llkelihood that lt will fail 
to develop the acceptance it needs to become an int1:•gral pa:r.t of how social 
decisions ari~ made. An important resolution that has com(; out of the study 
of risk p1:.>t·ception is that there are no unlv,;rsal ly acceptable risks, but 
ra.ther an acceptable risk is that risk associ::i.ted with the most acceptabl,1. 
alternative in a partieular decis.ion problem. ThEi accE,pt:ibility of ri.sks 
the.re at',,:! no generally ,,.co.>ptabh• risks, accepterl ones (e.g •• 
Fischhoff, Lichtenstein 1 Slavic, l9Hl). 
An important implication of this refinement is that perceived risk may 
be partly determined by the decision-making context from which risks 
evolve. Consequently, peoples' perception of risk may also be influenced 
by the way in which decisions about risks are made. If so, then an 
acceptable risk may be one arising from an acceptable decision-making 
process. Further research is needed to identify the role that decision 
making methods play in determining public attitudes toward technological 
decisions and the people and institutions that make them. The results of 
that research would be an important step toward understanding how public 
risk attitudes and concerns can be incorporated into the methodologies used 
by those who make decisions concerning risks at the societal level. 
There are other forms that future research in this area might take, 
all of which would be profitable given our present level of understanding. 
One of the more general questions that deserves study relates to developing 
a better understanding of what role people wish deliberative decision 
making to take in societal decisions. Are there social, moral and ethical 
values that appear to people to receive adquate attention and consideration 
only through thoughtful, deliberative behavior on the part of a decision 
maker? What are the constitutents of deliberation and how do people judge 
the adequacy of deliberation? How is cost/risk benefit analysis judged as 
a component of a deliberative decision-making process? Our limited 
research knowledge to date suggests that deliberation on the part of a 
decision maker can, under some circumstances, enhance the perceived quality 
of risk analysis. The generalizability of this finding to other contexts 
and other variants of formal analysis needs to be established before it can 
be put into useful practice. 
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Deliberation as a component of decision making can also imply the 
incorpor~tion of intuition into the substance of a decision maker's 
thoughts. A relatively rich background of research exists on people's 
intuit.ive reas abilities, the general theme of whi.ch has hec,;n to show 
that lntuition can lead to flaws in judgmental processes. We are much less 
knowledgE~ahl1~ about what functions peopl,~ lx.::lieve intuition ser-ves. Do 
they, f,:Jr example, perceive intuition as a. mr,mtal activity that serves the 
purpose of distinguishing basic right from wrong? Is it seen as the avenue 
by which important moral and ethical issues an, resolved in the course of 
day to day acttvities? Do people have greater trust and confidence i:i. 
those who they feel are b1~tter endowe.d with intuitive ,'lbilities? By what 
researd, methodologies can W<'J study peoples I perceptions of the function 
and quality of intutti.on, particularly ns it applies to soeietal deciRi.on 
making? Pursuing this research di.reetion would give us a bm,is for 
under.standing how to interface the rational, mechanized principles of 
decision making as represented in formal analysis with the relatively 
"soft" human \n1lues that are components of important moral and ethical 
dimensions of social decisions. 
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Captions for Figures 
Figure 1: Cost-benefit 
Figure 2: Factor plot of decision-making conditions in the two-factor 




Cost if the Vehicle is Changed 
A. The manufacturer could expect to sell 400,000 compact cars 
at $4 , 250 each. 
B. Making the change to the vehicle would cost $11 per car, 
bringing the price of the vehicle to $4,261. 
C. Therefore, the total cost to consumers for making the change 
to the vehicle would be: 400,000 x $11 = $4,400,000. 
' Benefit if the Vehicle is Changed 
A. Each year, 500 people die from accidents associated with 
driving or rid~ng in compact cars. 
B. There are about 49 million drivers and passengers of compact 
cars in the United States. 
C. The chances of an individual being fatally injured in an ac-
cident while driving or riding in a compact car are: 
1 chance in 98,000 
(or a probability of .0000102). 
D. Changing the vehicle would reduce the chances of a driver or 
passenger being fatally injured to: 
1 chance in 99,000 
(or a probability of • 0000101) 
This represents a change of about 1 chance in 10,000,000. You 
might think of it this way; driving or riding in a compact car 
without the change would be like taking an additional risk 
with a 1 in 10,000,000 chance of fatal injury. 
E. Change in fatalities: 
Predicted fatalities if the car l!!!!?.! changed: 
.0000102 x 49 million users= 500 fatalities 
Predicted fatalities if the car is changed: 
.0000101 x 49 million users= 494 fatalities 
Changing the vehicle results in a difference of: 6 fatalities 
F. The costs per fatality were estimated to be: $400,000 per 
fatality 
G. Therefore, the total benefit of changing the vehicle would be: 
6 fatalities x $400,000 = $2,400,000 
f.AtJj)JL.ll 
HORAL & ETHICAL 
SENSITIVE 
CONSIDERS UNCERTAINTY 








V EXPECTED VALUE RISK ANALYSIS I 
0 COST-DENEF IT ANALYSIS 

































Figure 2. Factor plot of decision-making conditions in the two-factor space 
codcJ for decision-making method. 
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